Hegel-by-HyperText Resources
 1841:
The World-Historic Split
in Western Philosophy
 The "Expurgation of Hegelianism"
  As well as having been embraced by the Prussian Monarchy as a kind of  official creed, Hegel left behind him a movement which inspired powerful  revolutionary criticism of the very official society which had  sanctified him.
  The ten years after Hegel's death were the apogee of Hegelianism. His  students, who had lived under the master's spell during his lifetime,  went out and popularised his teachings and translated them into the  language of politics - or much more correctly, translated politics into  the language of Hegelianism.
  In 1841, the establishment deliberatively moved to "expunge the dragon's  seed of Hegelian pantheism" from the minds of Prussian youth. A  newly-appointed Minister for Culture mobilised Friedrich Schelling to come to Berlin and do the job.
  Friedrich Schelling was the second, and in 1841, the only living  representative of Classical German Philosophy. The former Professor of  Philosopher at Jena after Fichte's dismissal for heresy, who as a youth  had been a close friend of Hegel, had both encouraged Hegel and enlisted  his support in his struggle against Fichte. Although pushed into the philosophical background by the great G W F Hegel, he had also out-lived Hegel.
  “Ask anybody in Berlin today on what field the battle for dominion over  German public opinion in politics and religion, that is, over Germany  itself, is being fought, and if he has any idea of the power of the mind  over the world he will reply that this battlefield is the University,  in particular Lecture Hall No. 6, where Schelling is giving his lectures  on the Philosophy of Revelation. For at the moment all the separate  oppositions which contend with Hegel's philosophy for this dominion are  obscured, blurred and pushed into the background by the one opposition  of Schelling; all the attackers who stand outside philosophy, Stahl,  Hengstenberg, Neander, are making way for a fighter who is expected to  give battle to the unconquered on his own ground. And the battle is  indeed peculiar enough. Two old friends of younger days, room mates at  the Tübingen theological seminary, are after forty years meeting each  other again face to face as opponents; one of them ten years dead but  more alive than ever in his pupils; the other, as the latter say,  intellectually dead for three decades, but now suddenly claiming for  himself the full power and authority of life. Anybody who is  sufficiently "impartial" to profess himself equally alien to both, that  is, to be no Hegelian, for surely nobody can as yet declare himself on  the side of Schelling after the few words he has said - anybody then,  who possesses this vaunted advantage of "impartiality" will see in the  declaration of Hegel's death pronounced by Schelling's appearance in  Berlin, the vengeance of the gods for the declaration of Schelling's  death which Hegel himself pronounced in his time”. 
   “An imposing, colourful audience has assembled to witness the battle. At  the front the notables of the University, the leading lights of  science, men everyone of whom has created a trend of his own; for them  the seats nearest to the rostrum have been reserved, and behind them,  jumbled together as chance brought them to the hall, representatives of  all walks of life, nations, and religious beliefs. In the midst of  high-spirited youths there sits here and there a grey-breaded staff  officer and next to him perhaps, quite unembarrassed, a volunteer who in  any other society would not know what to do for reverence towards such a  high-ranking superior. Old doctors and ecclesiastics, the jubilee of  whose matriculation can soon be celebrated feel the long-forgotten  student haunting their minds again and are back in college. Judaism and  Islam want to see what Christian revelation is all about: German,  French, English, Hungarian, Polish, Russian, modern Greek and Turkish,  one can hear them all spoken together, - then the signal for silence  sounds and Schelling mounts the rostrum. 
  “A man of middle stature, with white hair and light-blue, bright eyes,  whose expression is gay rather than imposing and, combined with a  certain fullness of figure, indicates more the jovial family-man than  the thinker of genius, a harsh but strong voice, Swabian-Bavarian  accent, that is Schelling's outward appearance”. [Engels, Schelling on Hegel, December 1841] 
  The audience also included the Russian anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin, and Søren Kierkegaard, who was to be the founder of Existentialism.  Schelling's proposition was that Hegel had confused "essence" and  "existence", and what was required was a return to a philosophy of existence.  Kierkegaard ridiculed Hegel for "reconstructing" history in retrospect,  "but history has to be lived forwards, not backwards". For his part,  Engels insisted that the youth and all enemies of the autocracy must  rally to the defence of Hegel. He characterised Schelling's proposition  as a "philosophy of revelation", or "positivism" (as opposed to the  "negative" standpoint of Reason).
  Schelling did not, as it turned out, win much support for his position,  but the young Danish theologian Kierkegaard, declaring the bankruptcy of  Reason, can be seen as the founder of Existentialism, which is  continued through Friedrich Nietzsche, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger  and through Heidegger is a significant component of today's  philosophical cloudscape. Existentialism appears to pick up from  Schelling's denunciation of Hegel's focus on Essence, and substitutes  for Hegel's study of the Essential genesis of notions an analysis of Being.
  Arthur Schopenhauer,  who had taught at the University of Berlin for 24 semesters, and had  spoken regularly to an empty lecture hall, next door and at the same  hour when Hegel lectured to a large and ever-growing audience. In May  1825 he had renounced his career to live as a recluse. In 1844, an  obscure Berlin bookseller accepted the manuscript of Schopenhauer's  oft-rejected The World as Will and Idea without remuneration and this book - the founding work of Voluntarism,  in the style of Classical German philosophy but passionately hostile to  its spirit - gained Schopenhauer worldwide recognition and caused  Nietzsche to speak of Schopenhauer as his "great teacher".
  In Britain, John Stuart Mill and in France Auguste Comte came forward as the proponents of Positivism.  Positivism is a difficult thing to characterise, because like any  ideology, it is intimately connected with the fate not of any given  proposition or thesis, but with the fate of a social entity and rises  and falls and transforms itself according to the fate of the social  movement it reflects. Positivism is that current in epistemology which  seeks to speak for science; it rejects "speculation" and sees the task  of philosophical knowledge as summing up and expressing the positive  knowledge gathered by the sciences. In the first phase of its  development, first place was given to sociology; in this it expressed a  belief in the liberating power of science and the urgent need for  science to replace religion and all forms of non-scientific  "metaphysical" or religious speculation, and consequently the need for a  scientific conception of society, based on the rational analysis of the  data of the senses.
  Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin  had studied Hegel in Moscow but had emigrated in 1840 to join the Young  Hegelians in Berlin. His later career would see Bakunin fighting in the  Revolution of 1848 in Prague and Dresden, returning to Russia, exiled  to Siberia, joining the First International but finally expelled in 1872  and founding the Narodnik and Anarchist movements in Russia - the most  extreme of bourgeois radicals, advocating immediate insurrection and the  smashing of all states.
  Earlier in 1841, Ludwig Feuerbach had published his Essence of Christianity:  “with one blow it pulverised the contradiction, in that without  circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists  independently of all philosophy ... the spell was broken; the "system"  was exploded and cast aside ... one must have experienced the liberating  effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general ...  but a philosophy is not disposed of by the mere assertion that it is  false... it had to be "sublated" in its own sense, ... the new content  which had been won through it had to be saved ...” [Engels' Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy].
  In almost a moment, following the sacking of Kaiser Wilhelm Friedrich's  Culture Minister in 1841, sprung Existentialism, Voluntarism, Anarchism,  Positivism and Materialism!
  Engels said of Schelling's 1841 speech:
  "It will be our business to follow the course of his  [Schelling's] thinking and to shield the great man's [Hegel's] grave  from abuse. We are not afraid to fight. Nothing more desirable could  have happened to us than for a time to be 'The Church Oppressed'. There  the minds part. What is not genuine is proved in the fire, what is false  we shall not miss in our ranks. The opponents must grant us that youth  has never before flocked to our colours in such numbers, that the  thought which dominates us has never before unfolded itself so richly,  that courage, conviction, talent have never been so much on our side as  now. Hence we shall rise confidently against the new enemy; in the end,  one will be found among us who will prove that the sword of enthusiasm  is just as good as the sword of genius. 
   "Let Schelling see whether he can muster a school. Many only join him  now because they are opposed to Hegel and accept with gratitude anybody  who attacks him ..." [Schelling on Hegel, December 1841] 
  In October 1843, Engels published his Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy, which caught the attention of Karl Marx and the 23-year-olds struck up a correspondence. ...
  By 1848, the year of publication of the Communist Manifesto,  Europe was ablaze with Revolution. For the first time, the proletariat  came on to the political scene as a force for itself. The Revolution was  defeated, with the Junkers gaining control in Germany and the Army in  France. But throughout the following period, the working class remained  the chief threat to bourgeois society. The First International was  founded in 1863, with the Trades Councils in Britain and the rapid rise  of the German Social Democratic Party and the Paris Commune holding  state power for a short period in 1871.
  The emergence of labour as a conscious social force puts a final end to  the classical period of bourgeois epistemology. The explosion of 1841  anticipates this explosion and the irreversible sea-change which  follows. "Nature" has spoken. For bourgeois philosophy prior to this  time, the labouring masses (or what the postmoderns call the  “sub-altern” - the “congregation” who get spoken of and to, but have  themselves no right to speak) were like Nature, something ‘beyond  sensation’, the unconscious.
 Irrationalism & Positivism
  The period of development of bourgeois philosophy from the 1840s to the  1860s is the period in which the tendencies and forces of a new epoch of  development are formed. The period of expansion of capitalism which  followed the defeat of the Commune in 1871 up to the exhaustion of the  period of colonial expansion and the opening of the period of  Imperialism at the turn of the century, marks the next specific period  in the development of bourgeois ideology.
  From the 1840s, it is no longer possible for bourgeois ideology to be  developed in the form of a "secular religion", but ideology is worked  out in conflict within specific, separate domains of enquiry,  principally: political economy, psychology, natural science and  sociology.
  The figures who launch the initial attack on Hegel, Feuerbach and  Schelling, did not gather around them a substantial and lasting  following. John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte were already well-known by  the end of the 1830s, and as it turns out, the principal figures of the  first period immediately following 1841 are Mill, Comte and later  Herbert Spencer (Positivists), Søren Kierkegaard and Arthur Schopenhauer  (the precursors to Existentialism), the Anarchist Mikhail Bakunin and  Communists Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. 
  Politically speaking, these figures cover as wide a field as it is possible to imagine. 
  Without blurring the differences between Anarchism and Communism and the  class basis of these political differences, it is not sensible to  comprehend either Marxism or Anarchism as part of the organism of  bourgeois ideology. They will be considered separately elsewhere.
  The others philosophically speaking divide clearly into two camps.  Despite the mutual hostility which is a professional prerequisite and  despite the political diversity within each camp, we have on the one  hand, the "sociologists" Comte, Mill and Spencer, and on the other hand,  the "psychologists" Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer.
 The Human Condition
  The young Ludwig Feuerbach expressed the common Essence of the downfall  of Hegelianism, and he has to be credited with the fact that he launched  his attack on Hegel while Hegel was still flavour of the decade:
  "Modern philosophy has realised and negated the divine being who is  separated and distinguished from sensation, the world, and man. But it  realised and negated this divine being only in thought, in reason, and  indeed in that reason that is also separated and distinguished from  sensation, the world, and man. Namely, modern philosophy has proved only  the divinity of mind; it recognised only mind, and indeed the abstract  mind, as the divine and absolute being." [s.18, Principles of Philosophy of the Future, published 2 years after The Essence of Christianity, in 1843] 
   When Comte, for instance, says:
  "The Universe is to be studied not for its own sake, but for the sake of  ... Humanity. To study it in any other spirit would not only be  immoral, but also highly irrational. For, as statements of pure  objective truth, our scientific theories can never be really  satisfactory ... It is for social feeling to determine these limits;  outside which our knowledge will always remain imperfect as well as  useless ... the intellect would, under Positivism, accept its proper  position of subordination to the heart", 
  there is a significant debt to Hegel, but he also is definitively  calling for an end to "metaphysics", and when Kierkegaard says:  "science, fully as much as poetry and art, assumes a mood ...  an error in modulation is just as disturbing as an error in the  exposition of thought" we can recognise something of the same thought.  The problem is that Comte's solution (which was probably the dominant  one) led to a further shattering of the unity of human labour, with  1,001 "specialists" beavering away in their own little area. Thus, the  great synthesis which Hegel achieved, albeit idealistically, was lost on  the very people who most needed it. 
  Feuerbach opened the first, historical section of Philosophy of the Future  with: "The task of the modern era was the realisation and humanisation  of God - the transformation and dissolution of theology into  anthropology."  And he shows that this begins with Protestantism.  Everyone was saying that the human agency did not just express  something (such as The Absolute Idea), this human "agency" was itself  the issue, man was not just an "agent". This was already implicit in the  highly political way in which the Young Hegelians were promoting  philosophy, and the establishment knew it!
  Kierkegaard is on about sin; he wants to not just observe sin, explain it, call it an illness - it must be denounced,  and denouncing sin meant real pain and suffering. He is against  "scientific objectivity", of dispassionately looking at sin as something  neutral, objective. His whole thing about moods is a knife aimed at the whole basis of Logic, "Rationalism" (in the degraded sense of the word) and Absolute Idea.
  Schopenhauer wanted to place the human, subjective Will at the centre of the system, not an objective thought form but a very subjective, human, suffering, painful Will:
  "every stronger or heterogeneous affection of these sense-organs is  painful, in other words, is against the Will; ... to make them data for  the understanding, [they must] reach the higher degree at which they  stir the will, that is to say, excite pain or pleasure, though more  often pain." 
  And Feuerbach is going in a direction which has some point of contact with this:
  "The new philosophy regards and considers being as it is for us, not  only as thinking but as really existing beings; thus, it regards being  as an object of being, as an object of itself. Being as an object of  being - and only this being is being and deserves the name of being - is  the being of the senses, perception, feeling, and love. Being is thus a  secret of perception, of feeling, and of love." [s.33, Principles of Philosophy of the Future] 
 Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer
  Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer are united, if in little else, in their abiding hatred of Hegel.
  The object of Kierkegaard's attention is sin. In his definitive attack on Hegel, The Concept of Dread, he points out that "science, fully as much as poetry and art, assumes a mood  ... an error in modulation is just as disturbing as an error in the  exposition of thought". ... "but the correct mood [for consideration of  sin] is the stout-hearted opposition of seriousness. The mood of  psychology is the dread corresponding to its discovery, and in  its dread it delineates sin, while again and again it is alarmed by the  sketch it produces. When sin is treated in such a way it becomes the  stronger ... As soon as sin is talked about as a sickness, an  abnormality, a poison, a disharmony, then the concept too is falsified.  Sin does not properly belong in any science. It is the theme with which the sermon  deals, ..." Kierkegaard goes on to say that Ethics is also not the  correct science to deal with sin as "Ethics is after all an ideal  science, ... Ethics bring ideality into reality; on the other hand its  movement is not designed to raise reality up into ideality." So it is  only "dogmatics", i.e. Christian dogma, which is capable of dealing with  sin: "While psychology is fathoming the real possibility of sin,  dogmatics explains original sin, which is the ideal possibility of sin".   [excerpts from The Concept of Dread, Søren Kierkegaard, 1844] 
  For Hegel "All that is rational is real, and all that is real is  rational". Outraged by the corrupt and sinful character of the Church  and society of his day, Kierkegaard it is not content to explain or  deplore it. It must be denounced: "The new ethics presupposes dogmatics  and along with that original sin, and by this it now explains the sin of  the individual, while at the same time it presents ideality as a task, not however by a movement from above down, but from below up."
  Schopenhauer on the other hand builds a system of the type of Classical German Philosophy, but with the Will  at the centre: "The process through which and in which the body exists,  are nothing but the phenomenal appearance of the Will, ... the parts of  the body must correspond completely to the chief demands and desires by  which the Will manifests itself; ... Teeth, gullet, and intestinal  canal are objectified hunger; the genitals are objectified sexual  impulse." Schopenhauer's philosophy is thus given the name of  Voluntarism, seeking to resolve the scepticism of Kant by identifying  the thing-in-itself with Will (rather than Ego as with Fichte or Nature  as in the earlier Schelling). 
  Schopenhauer's position is, like Fichte, that of subjective idealism:  "what other kind of existence or reality could we attribute to the rest  of the material world? From what source could we take the elements out  of which we construct such a world? Besides the will and the  representation, there is absolutely nothing known or conceivable for  us."  [from The World as Will and Representation, Arthur Schopenhauer, 1819 / 1844]
  Schopenhauer has made an important progression from Kant in that he has  recognised the identity between human needs and sensuous representation:  "every stronger or heterogeneous affection of these sense-organs is  painful, in other words, is against the Will; ... to make them data for  the understanding, [they must] reach the higher degree at which they  stir the will, that is to say, excite pain or pleasure, though more  often pain." The pessimistic tenor of Schopenhauer's philosophy is  brought out particularly sharply: experience is "pleasure, though more  often pain"! But the dualism of the subject-object relation is resolved  by totally subordinating the material world to the individual Will,  resolving the dualism in favour of the subject, for whom the outer world  is just so much "pleasure, though more often pain"!
  However, within of the secular religious mentality of classical  epistemology, this subjective idealism is invariably reactionary in its  political implications because it belittles the creative function of  labour and promotes the unrestricted action of the rulers. The  resistance of Nature to the Will is "pain" which must be overcome by  greater force.
  Thus both Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard reject what they see as Hegel's  "rationalism", in favour of a turn inward to Faith, in the case of  Kierkegaard, and Will in the case of Schopenhauer. In both cases the  value of Knowledge is deliberatively discounted in favour of Feeling, Reason in favour of Will (be it Divine or human), Experience in favour of Suffering.
  Both these tendencies have inspired and attracted the political Right,  and there is certainly nothing progressive or optimistic about them.  Both were religious but non-conformist, Kierkegaard a devout Lutheran at  war with the established Church, Schopenhauer a respectable German  bourgeois, with a somewhat “New Age” interest in Hinduism. 
  It is easy to say that their philosophy was a negative, pessimistic  response to the rise of the proletariat, but why and how is such a  reaction expressed in such epistemology? And why at this time? And also,  there is a grain of truth: the doctrine of absolute rationality is itself a form of secular religion, as shown by Ludwig Feuerbach in his 1841 Essence of Christianity. 
  Note that Schopenhauer was not an opponent of science. In fact,  prior to his philosophical writing, he was himself active in natural  science (especially in the popular business of analysing sensations).  Pragmatism as well as Existentialism owes a debt to Voluntarism and for  example in the form of the Operationalism of Percy Bridgman, gets along  with natural science quite as well as empiricism or better. The name of  "Irrationalism" which we can attach to Existentialism and Voluntarism  and to a certain extent also Pragmatism, should not be taken as a term of abuse. Irrationalism comes forward to point out the limitations and failures of reason and experience, and it has its grain of truth.
 Comte and Mill
  The period following the expurgation of Hegelianism in Germany has John  Stuart Mill the leading figure of philosophy in Britain and Auguste  Comte in France. Both were great synthesisers and reflected the  scientific optimism of the bourgeoisie of their time, taking their  inspiration from Kant and Hume, seemingly unmoved by either Hegelianism  or its condemnation in Germany. Each, however, respond to the changed  social conditions of Europe by the promotion of Ethics.
  Mills' Ethics is that of Utilitarianism. Jeremy Bentham, renowned for  his theories of prison reform, should properly be given credit as  originator of Utilitarianism, but it was Mills was systematically  elaborated the theory and did so in conjunction with political economy  and his theoretical work on the foundations of the British political  system.
  Comte coined the term "Positivism", by which he understood the "third  phase" of development of human society after theology and metaphysics,  in which explanations were in terms of essences, final causes, and other  abstractions. The modern positive stage, is distinguished by an  awareness of the limitations of human knowledge. Knowledge, he held,  could only be relative to man's nature as a species and to his social  and historical situation. Absolute explanations were therefore better  abandoned for the more sensible discovery of laws based on the  observable relations between phenomena. Sociology would reduce social  facts to laws and synthesise the whole of human knowledge. 
  Comte was no democrat however. His notion of social organisation  imitated the hierarchy and discipline of the Catholic church. From  various Enlightenment philosophers he adopted the notion of historical  progress, and from Saint-Simon he drew the need for a basic and unifying  "sociology" to explain existing social organisations and guide social  planning for a better future. 
  Like Mill, he held that the underlying principles of society are  individual egoism, encouraged by the division of labour, and the  combination of efforts and the maintenance of social cohesion by means  of government and the state. However, Comte rejected democracy,  emphasising hierarchy and obedience, and like Saint-Simon, he held that  the ideal government would be made up of an intellectual elite,  utilising a kind of humanist religion in order to secure social  cohesion. 
  Both men assisted in promoting women's suffrage in the wake of the  tragic death of the love of their life, and both were advocates of  reform of various kinds within their own country. In philosophy, both  emphasise the rational analysis of the data of perception and give  priority to social development.
  In these two "progressive" bourgeois gentlemen, we see in classic form  the national characteristics of British and French philosophy: Mill, an  ethic based on the laws of the political economy of laissez faire  capitalism, Comte, an ethic of the benign dictatorship of Reason based  on laws of socio-historical formation of knowledge and belief.
 A New Period of Essential Development
  December 1841 marks a discontinuity of spectacular sharpness in German  philosophy. Just as in Einstein's physics there can be no simultaneity  of events separated in space, so also, in the broader European scene,  the rupture of 1841 is manifested in an array of changes, reflecting a  common underlying process of transformation, which in turn has its  social spectacle in the Revolutions of 1848.
  In the period prior to 1841, European civilisation was working out  social-historical problems in a domain of thinking which had been  separated out from the whole, concrete life of society, the Theory of  Knowledge, an abstraction made possible by the highly developed division  of labour, and in particular the exploitation of wage labour.
  I have characterised this struggle as an alienated formulation of the  struggle to understand the relation of human labour and human needs. But  this by no means takes away form the fact that real conquests were made  in the Theory of Knowledge. Human society was long, long ago shattered  by the social division of labour, and the transcendence of this rupture  is a long drawn out historical struggle. The mystical character of the  process follows from the limitations imposed on professional thinkers  under conditions where the real contact with Nature, real production and  the real satisfaction of natural human needs is unspoken and  unconscious because the producing class itself is silent. Well, it is not silent - but it is not heard.
  The period of transformation of bourgeois ideology we are looking at is the period, in Britain, from the publication of the People's Charter  in 1838 which continued up to the final Chartist demonstrations in  1848, the same year which saw the popular uprising in Paris in February,  bringing down the July Monarchy, the rioting in Vienna which led to the  fall of Metternich and the emancipation of the peasantry, the  nationalist uprisings in Hungary, the movement for representative  government in Germany and the publication of the Communist Manifesto,  and leads up to the founding of the First International and The  American Civil War in 1863 and the Paris Commune in 1871. The uprisings  and revolutions of 1848 are all defeated but all in one way or another  see many of their objectives achieved during the period of relative  stability and prosperity which followed. 
  The theory of knowledge has already gone as far as it can go in the 1844  Manuscripts of Karl Marx. But the bourgeoisie has already declared for  the expurgation of Hegel and young Marx's investigations have arrived at  the founding of the Communist League and publication of the Communist Manifesto calling for the overthrow of all existing social conditions.
  Meanwhile mechanics has attained a fairly high level of development, but  science generally is however still at an embryonic level insofar as it  relates to the human condition. The Origin of Species is not to  be published until 1859, while the science of psychology is still  embroiled in mysticism. Helmholtz formulates the law of conservation of  energy in 1847 and his work on nerve signals and body heat during the  1850s cut the ground away from vitalism. The sciences of anthropology  and sociology begin from this period.
  In other words, speculation about the human condition had taken  bourgeois society as far as it could, it was now necessary to begin the  positive enquiry and work out the details. In a sense, one must give  Comte his due: in declaring the end of the period of metaphysical  speculation and the beginning of the period of natural scientific  investigation with sociology at the centre, he stated with fair accuracy  exactly what was taking place.
  Hegel himself had expressed the same idea in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History:
  Anaxagoras was the first to enunciate the doctrine that Understanding  generally, or Reason, governs the world. It is not intelligence as  self-conscious Reason, - not a Spirit as such that is meant; and we must  clearly distinguish these from each other. The movement of the solar  system takes place according to unchangeable laws. These laws are  Reason, implicit in the phenomena in question. But neither the sun nor  the planets, which revolve around it according to these laws, can be  said to have any consciousness of them.
  A thought of this kind - that Nature is an embodiment of Reason; that it  is unchangeably subordinate to universal laws, appears nowise striking  or strange to us. We are accustomed to such conceptions, and find  nothing extraordinary in them. And I have mentioned this extraordinary  occurrence, partly to show how history teaches,  that ideas of this  kind, which may seem trivial to us, have not always been in the world;  that on the contrary, such a thought makes an epoch in the annals of  human intelligence. Aristotle says of Anaxagoras, as the originator of  the thought in question, that he appeared as a sober man among the  drunken. Socrates adopted the doctrine from Anaxagoras, and it forthwith  became the ruling idea in Philosophy, except in the school of Epicurus,  who ascribed all events to chance. 
  "I was delighted with the sentiment," - Plato makes Socrates say - "and  hoped I had found a teacher who would show me Nature in harmony with  Reason, who would demonstrate in each particular phenomenon its specific aim, and in the whole, the grand  object of the Universe. I would not have surrendered this hope for a  great deal. But how very much was I disappointed, when, having zealously  applied myself to the writings of Anaxagoras, I found that he adduces  only external causes, such as Atmosphere, Ether, Water, and the like."  It is evident that the defect which Socrates complains of respecting  Anaxagoras's doctrine, does not concern the principle itself, but the  shortcoming of the propounder in applying it to Nature in the concrete.  Nature is not deduced from that principle: the latter remains in fact a  mere abstraction, inasmuch as the former is not comprehended and  exhibited as a development of it - an organisation produced by and from  Reason. I wish, at the very outset, to call your attention to the  important difference between a conception, a principle, a truth limited  to an abstract form and its determinate application, and concrete development. [Philosophy of History, Introduction] 
  The problem is that the Theory of Knowledge has been left as "unfinished business". 
  What is more, European society is undergoing a further leap in the  social division of labour, and the pursuit of the natural sciences will  be manifested in a division of labour in the production of ideas which  further exacerbates the problem. British political economy and French  social theory have the elements of the puzzle, but they cannot put it  all together. The German bourgeoisie has suffered humiliating defeat at  the hands of the Junkers, and German Idealism has been debunked.
  This time marks the beginning of a new epoch of essential development of bourgeois ideology. Nature has spoken. In searching for an understanding of the human condition, one side, which I will call Irrationalism, wants to turn away, to turn inward, rejecting the value of knowledge in favour of Faith or Will; the other side, Positivism seeks an ethic of knowledge based on the accumulation of the positive knowledge of the sciences.
 An Historic Split
  The essential reason for this rupture in bourgeois ideology is the birth  of a self-conscious workers' movement. Foremost among those who gave  voice to this new historic force is Karl Marx. Marx's theory developed  on the basis of bourgeois society and the whole history of bourgeois  thought; it was not an transcription of the thoughts of proletarians and  nor did it base itself on a non-existent "proletarian culture". It is  nevertheless the theoretical expression of the social interests and  historical destiny of the new social force to which bourgeois society  had given birth. It is the independent historic destiny of the working  class which gives to Marxism its essential character. Try as it may,  bourgeois ideology can no longer represent the "whole people". 
  The split within bourgeois ideology comes from the fact that it has recoiled from monism and returned to one or another form of scepticism.
  However, the proletariat exists only as a part of bourgeois society. Any ideology which expresses its fate, must also share  its fate. Revolutionary socialist ideology has its own essential path  of development, different and distinct from that of bourgeois ideology.  However, the two intersect and mutually affect one another. Without for a  moment suggesting that Marxism develops in some pure and independent  way, isolated from the development of bourgeois culture, it is still  necessary to recognise two distinct organisms - bourgeois and  revolutionary-socialist ideology.
 Anarchism and Communism
  Revolutionary socialist ideology also developed in a struggle. Both  theoretical anarchism and modern socialism sprung from the dissolution  of the Young Hegelians  and drew upon the whole of bourgeois culture. The struggle between  Anarchism (Bakunin, Proudhon, and others) and Communism (Marx and  Engels) was the principal axis of development of the workers' movement  throughout the next two generations including the First International,  the Paris Commune and the Russian Revolution. 
  Andy Blunden, 1998. 
 
   
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